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Summary
•  Both practitioners and scholars tend to re-
gard Science and Technology Agreements 
(STA) to be important, prominent, and highly 
effective tools for science diplomacy (SD). 
Yet it is far from clear whether they form 
an integral part of strategic approaches to-
ward SD or mostly remain rather erratic ad-
hoc agreements with more probably vague 
or even insignificant roles. Since we know 
but little about the development of STA over 
time, it is very difficult to get data and a valid 
picture on what is going on there at all and 
what impact STA might have.
•  Based on a working definition of STA, we con-
ducted a quantitative study to map the STA 
that six countries (DK, FR, DE, CH, UK, U.S.) 
and the European Union have signed between 
1961 and 2016. In addition, through a range 
of expert interviews, we tried to capture prac-
titioners’ views on the role and workings of 
STA in the realms of international science 
policy and SD in particular.
•  What we see is a large increase in the num-
ber of concluded STA over time. While some 
of the countries in our sample made exten-
sive use of STA, others were more hesitant 
or even reluctant to do so. Still, we witness a 
strong integration of G20-states in a network 
of bilateral STA. To illustrate the highly diverse 
uses and importance of STA, we present four 
cases of negotiations that point to their lim-
ited strategic use. From our expert interviews, 
we could differentiate between four types of 
views or opinions with regard to the uses of 
STA.
•  If we view STA in their respective political 
context, some apparently erratic provisions 
turn into meaningful strategic instruments. 
Overall, STA may carry different meanings 
to different stakeholders engaged in the ne-
gotiations; this is why they always serve as 
boundary objects.
•  For future research, it would be worthwhile to 
look into the interconnections, or interplays, 
between STA and other tools of SD on the one 
hand and contextual variables like geopo-
litical shifts and organisational backgrounds 
that shape negotiations and appraisal of STA 
on the other.
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Introduction
In the wake of increasing global competition 
and challenges, science and technology (S&T) 
issues gain more and more attention in interna-
tional relations and foreign policy. Eager for en-
hancing their S&T capabilities and international 
position, national governments, research organ-
isations, foundations and companies engage 
Diplomacy for Science to stimulate and bolster 
global research collaborations and internation-
alisation. In addition, science has come to be 
seen as means to foster diplomatic relations 
between nations, following the idea of Science 
for Diplomacy (Royal Society, 2010). 
Consequently, numerous countries are now en-
gaging in what they consider Science Diplomacy 
(SD). However, the means and ends of their ac-
tivities differ widely not just between countries 
but also compared to other stakeholders and 
players in that field (Flink & Schreiterer, 2010). 
While some governments focus on improving 
research excellence, business opportunities, 
and innovation, others like the U.S. leverage SD 
to sustain and enhance international relations 
and their international standing. Similarly, other 
stakeholders seize widely different means to 
pursue their objectives. Science and Technol-
ogy Agreements (STA) are often regarded con-
venient tools to serve strategic SD objectives. 
For example, Van Langenhove (2017) counts 
STA among effective instruments of SD like 
S&T advisory boards, science counsellors de-
ployed at embassies, or the opening of nation-
al research funding schemes to partners from 
abroad. In this view, STA are policy instruments 
whose well-defined means, resources and ob-
jectives make a clear difference to more general 
approaches or programs in the toolbox of SD. 
The literature on STA supports the view that 
they have become a flexible device of SD that 
may serve very different ends at the same time.
Dolan (2012), for instance, studied the STA that 
the U.S. government had entered, starting with 
an agreement with Japan in 1961. She identi-
fied four drivers for concluding STA: Transform-
ing diplomatic relations, promoting public diplo-
macy, highlighting cooperation on the occasion 
of an official state visit, and protecting U.S. Na-
tional Security. According to her, the conclusion 
of all current U.S.-STA can be traced back to 
different configurations of these four motives, 
what she demonstrated with several case stud-
ies. In a report to the Directorate General for 
Research and Innovation of the European Com-
mission (EC), Fikkers and Horvat (2014) pulled 
up 11 additional reasons for signing STA that 
address different aspects of the research and 
innovation process, such as facilitating mobility 
of human capital or to get access to research 
infrastructures and new markets. Overall, the 
authors distinguished a narrow set of S&T-relat-
ed objectives from a broader, fuzzier perspec-
tive on STA which also includes issues that are 
more related to the Science for Diplomacy side 
of SD. In particular, they tried to pinpoint the ef-
fectiveness of STA by a comparative analysis 
of 103 agreements; however, the heterogeneity 
of STA and diverging modes of evaluation and 
review procedures make it difficult to come up 
with sound outcomes, let alone a clear picture. 
Rather, the report suggests that–despite posi-
tive effects in individual cases–signing such 
agreements may even happen merely acciden-
tally, lacking clear strategy and goals.1 
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In spite of such, after all, rather favourable gen-
eral appraisals of STA, a few pieces are missing 
in the puzzle. In particular, we see three major 
shortcomings:
•  The actual understandings, and uses, of STA 
differ as much as the definitions of, and ap-
proaches to SD. In particular, this holds true 
for their implementation and outcomes. It is 
always national governments that negotiate 
these agreements with one another. But apart 
from that we notice a great variety of types 
of contracts, treaties, and memoranda of 
understanding between all kinds of entities: 
National governments, individual ministries, 
provinces and states, funding institutions, 
research organisations, and universities all 
maintain their own network of collabora-
tions. Partly, these are formalised by way of 
some kind of STA, but mostly, they are just 
informal.
•  So far, literature has paid but little attention 
to the development and diffusion of STA over 
time. If STA were an operational tool for SD, 
however, we should be able to observe their 
diffusion occurring in lockstep with the ex-
pansion of SD activities in general. In a simi-
lar vein, we might presume there is a close 
correlation between the conclusion of STA 
and general trends in international relations.
• The great heterogeneity of STA across dif-
ferent cases, topics and stakeholders cast 
doubts on the claim that they are an essen-
tial part of each SD toolbox. While aims, mo-
tives, and drivers more often than not remain 
obscure, sometimes STA seem to hamper, or 
even contradict, a general SD agenda. 
In this case study, we tried to tackle these short- 
comings in the following way:
•  To avoid the risk of not seeing the wood for 
the trees, first we settled for a working defini-
tion of STA as basis for a coherent analysis 
of STA as tools of SD.
•  To amend recent studies on STA, we looked 
into their development over time. In addition, 
we linked the gist of STA with geopolitical 
trends so that we might be able to identify 
cases in which they clearly serve as a part of 
SD initiatives. Last but not least, we tried to 
map the diffusion of STA all across the globe. 
•  To tell if STA might be valuable tools for SD, 
we picked up on the views of practitioners in 
the field of SD who are familiar with different 
aspects and matters of SD. 
Ultimately, we hope we could shed some new 
lights on both the general development of STA 
over time and their handling by SD experts.
Method
The landscape of STA is highly diverse: There are 
many different types of agreements in place be-
tween different actors in the field of S&T. To get 
a common base for our analysis, we looked for 
a working definition of the specific type of STA 
we wanted to investigate in more detail. In order 
to get there, we first narrowed down our sample 
according to the rationale of our case study. As 
we wanted to analyse the role of STA in national 
SD toolboxes, we dismissed all agreements be-
tween non-state actors or memoranda of under-
standing that lack a legally binding character. 
STA on interministerial or province-level were 
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left out as well because they do not necessarily 
follow, or reflect, governmental strategies. Like-
wise, we did not survey agreements that were 
negotiated on a multilateral basis such as, for 
instance, big science projects like ITER or the 
Large Hadron Collider at CERN. While we are 
aware of the fact that matters of science and/
or technology may also be part of economic 
or cultural agreements due to national pathde-
pendencies or idiosyncrasies, we are positive 
that these types of agreement tend to affect, 
and cope with, scientific collaboration in a rath-
er indirect manner only. For example, free-trade 
agreements like CETA or TPP may easily impact 
scientific collaboration in that they set rules of 
investment and regulations for travelling. How-
ever, they are not genuinely designed to serve 
and shape S&T affairs or policies. Hence, we in-
stead focused on agreements explicitly geared 
toward matters of scientific interaction and im-
portance between the concluding partners. 
For the sake of simplicity, we based our study 
on the following working definition: 
“STA are all agreements concluded in the name 
of the respective governments of two countries 
in a legally binding form (so called ‘umbrella 
agreements’).”
This definition refers to formal elements (legal 
status, types of actors, bilateral activity) rather 
than the content of such agreements. As a mat-
ter of fact, however, most agreements qualify-
ing for becoming part of our study were largely 
similar both in their features and content. Um-
brella agreements of the kind we wanted to ex-
amine tend to be highly formalised (cf. Fikkers 
& Horvart, 2014). Instead of studying contents, 
we took it to be more interesting and fruitful to 
focus on the spread of STA across the globe, 
patterns and networks, and on their appraisal 
by practitioners in the field of SD.
For our analysis, we chose a group of six coun-
tries as a core: Denmark, France, Germany, Swit-
zerland, the UK, and the U.S. In addition, we re-
searched STA concluded by the European Union. 
All countries in the sample are engaged in SD 
for quite some time already, which makes it eas-
ier to monitor long term developments. While all 
of these countries command a strong science 
sector, their respective science systems differ 
widely in terms of available resources, ways of 
governance, and operating procedures. This al-
lows us to track differences or isomorphic ten-
dencies in the use of STA as an instrument of 
SD. We included the European Union to examine 
whether it reproduces patterns of engagement 
that are similar to those its member states pur-
sue.
Our case study rests on both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. For the investigation on 
the development of STA over time, we searched 
governmental databases and homepages for 
treaties and agreements that matched our work-
ing definition. Looking at the time between 1961 
and 2016, we not just matched but extended 
the period Dolan (2012) had used in her study. 
In general, we tried to retrieve the original texts 
of the agreements. Where this was not possible, 
we relied on secondary sources to find out the 
exact dates that the STA were concluded. If pos-
sible, we also recorded the date of ratification. 
The retrieved information was analysed in sum 
as well as separately for each country over time. 
The data was searched for patterns of diffusion 
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with regard to similar partner countries or geo-
political events.
To assess the value practitioners attribute to 
STA as instruments of SD, we gathered qualita-
tive data from semi-structured expert interviews 
with representatives from the countries of our 
sample and the EC. The respective interviews 
took place in the second half of 2016 and the 
first half of 2017. Among the 38 interviewees 
were policy makers from ministries, representa-
tives from research institutions, funding organi-
sations, and science counsellors deployed at 
embassies.
Results
Quantitative Data
Our research findings indicate a steady increase 
of the number of concluded STA over time, a 
large diversity of involved states, and specific 
patterns of activity in some countries. In gener-
al, we see the development of a global network 
of STA over time (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Concluded STA by members of the core group 
(blue: core group members; green: partners with four 
or more STA; purple: partners with three or less STA)
On a global scale, the core group has concluded 
ever more STA from 1961 onwards (see Figure 
2). Even if one takes into consideration poten-
tial shortcomings and missing values in our 
desktop-research, the increase is remarkable.
Figure 2: Number of STA concluded by the different 
countries (cumulated over time)
However, we also notice that the frequency of 
the use, as well as the number of STA differ 
widely across the sample (see Table 1). The U.S., 
for instance, concluded 58 agreements during 
the period under consideration while Denmark 
concluded just one. Though this was framed as 
memorandum of understanding, unlike several 
other memoranda of understanding it fits into 
our definition of STA. We will get back to this 
particular result in the analysis of the qualita-
tive data.
Table 1: Number of recorded agreements between 
1961 and 2016 per country
The EU began to negotiate STA not until 1994. 
Since then it has concluded 19 agreements, 
Denmark France Germany Switzer-land UK U.S. EU
Number 
of agree-
ments
1 18 44 23 12 58 19
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most of them with countries that other mem-
bers of the core group already had contracted. 
In terms of diffusion, Switzerland, the UK, and 
Germany were among the early adopters of STA 
while the U.S. and France started using them 
more frequently only later on. The relative fre-
quency of STA for the UK and France has dimin-
ished over time while the U.S. made increased 
use of the instrument.
In our sample, we found a great diversity of col-
laborating parties. 83 countries were partners in 
at least one STA. In terms of geographic cover-
age, the Americas, Europe, and Asia account for 
the majority of signed STA. In particular, a group 
of states that is roughly identical with the G20 
has developed a network of STA amongst each 
other. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa) and some other states like Ar-
gentina and Tunisia are focal points of interest 
for the members of the core group (see Figure 
3). Africa represents the continent least cov-
ered by bilateral agreements of the core group.
Figure 3: Top 10 partner countries overall (X-axis: 
Name of country, Y-axis: Number of agreements 
concluded between members of the core group and 
the respective country)
At first sight, core group members seem to re-
sort to STA in erratic patterns across time; only 
the U.S. has steadily expanded the range of this 
instrument since the late 1990s. Still, some of 
the STA seem to match, and fit in, broader stra-
tegic or geopolitical patterns; in particular, this 
applies to four cases.
South Africa after 1995
The number of STA between the countries of 
the core group and South Africa has remarkably 
grown. Until 1995, none of the former carried an 
STA with South Africa. After 1995, this changed 
abruptly with Germany, the U.S., the UK (1995), 
and the EU (1996), signing STA. This clearly cor-
relates with the process of ending apartheid in 
South Africa during the first half of the 1990s 
and the desirable reintegration of the country 
into world politics. 
Germany and Eastern Europe
During the 1980s the Federal Republic of Ger-
many concluded numerous agreements with 
various states in Eastern Europe. Starting with 
an STA with the Soviet Union in 1986, agree-
ments with Hungary (1987), Bulgaria (1988), 
and Poland (1989) followed suit, the latter ironi-
cally just one day after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
This engagement with Eastern Europe contin-
ued with an STA with Czechoslovakia from 1990 
and Moldova from 1994. It is pretty obvious that 
these STA were not fuelled by scientific objec-
tives in the first place but by efforts to ease ten-
sions between Western and (former) Eastern 
Bloc states and to put inter-state relations on a 
new basis.
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Switzerland and Latin America
A different pattern of STA-activities becomes 
evident with Switzerland’s engagement in 
South and Central America. Within six years, 
the country signed seven agreements with sev-
eral states (Colombia, 1967; Brazil, Chile, 1968; 
Ecuador, 1969; Costa Rica, Paraguay, 1971; 
Bolivia, 1973). In less than a decade, Switzer-
land concluded STA with about one third of the 
countries in the region. This pattern points to 
a strategic plan for scientific and technological 
collaboration and support. Yet at the same time, 
STA were apparently also meant, and designed, 
to foster developmental collaboration and ca-
pacity building within the universal framework 
of science outside of the richest industrialised 
countries. In any case, the Swiss activities seem 
to testify a strategic focus on a region of sup-
posedly growing importance for both interna-
tional politics and economics. At the same time, 
they do also demonstrate Switzerland’s anxiety 
to leverage strategic niches in international S&T 
cooperation and/or innovation.
U.S.-engagement in the MENA-region
At the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. put 
remarkable effort in striking bilateral agreements 
with countries of the MENA-region. While a STA 
with Egypt was signed as early as 1995, between 
2003 and 2011 agreements with ten countries 
in the MENA-region and other countries with a 
Muslim-majority population followed suit. These 
activities clearly relate to the deteriorating rela-
tions between the U.S. and the countries of this 
region, particularly after the 9/11-attacks in New 
York and Washington in 2001 and the subse-
quently declared War on Terror.
Qualitative Data
While the quantitative part of the case study 
captured general patterns of diffusion, the quali-
tative part was meant to examine potential ben-
efits and flows of STA for SD by way of experts’ 
assessments and opinions.
The results indicate ambivalent appraisals of 
STA and different foci on diplomatic-political or 
scientific effects (cf. Table 2 for examples). In 
general, the recorded statements regarding STA 
can be sorted into a 4x4-typology. 
Table 2: Typology STA-assessments (Statements 
are direct quotes from interview partners)
While some experts generally approved of STA 
as an important tool for SD, the scientific im-
pact and importance clearly need to be kept 
apart from more general political effects. Some 
interview partners were truly enthusiastic about 
the opportunity to buttress bilateral scientific 
collaboration by means of STA. Other stressed 
the added value STA may bring to diplomatic 
relationships between states. In these cases, 
Attitude towards STA
Positive Negative
Main 
field of 
rele-
vance
Politi-
cal
“We have STAs with a 
great number of countries 
and that is an advantage 
because it is in a sense 
institutionalised…” 
[Interview Partner 1-2-17]
“The bilateral S&T agree-
ments involving the (Minis-
try’s name), to answer your 
question directly, is that 
it’s a mixed bag. In other 
words, some of them are 
nothing more than a piece 
of paper, that’s all they 
are.” [24-3-17]
Scien-
tific
“…I have the feeling it’s 
wanting to get everything 
set up clearly so that 
everybody knows what 
their responsibilities are 
and who will do what and 
how it will be funded.” [In-
terview Partner 18-3-17]
“So in (country name) it’s 
not something that we 
need in order to engage 
in a number of different 
(scientific, authors’ note) 
activities” [17-3-17]
Working paper 
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
10
they are seen as a vehicle to improve relations 
between state bureaucracies in charge of S&T, 
with STA serving as trust-building instruments. 
In contrast, other experts indicated strong scep-
ticism with respect to the effectiveness of STA 
to pursue national SD-agendas. Concerns per-
tained to the ad-hoc character of the negotia-
tions preceding STA, many of which are closely 
linked to events like ministerial visits in the part-
nering country. Some experts complained about 
the lack of continuous support and engagement 
from the side of the respective ministries and 
prevailing disinterestedness to keep up the in-
teraction with the partnering country once STA 
had solemnly been signed.
Furthermore, our interview data clearly indicate 
an interesting divide between the perspectives 
of administrative bodies on the one hand and re-
search organisations on the other respectively. 
While policy makers we interviewed across the 
board tended toward a positive appraisal of STA 
as a tool to foster bilateral relationships, repre-
sentatives of science organisations pointed to 
the large number of agreements they concluded 
with counterparts abroad which they consid-
ered far more valuable for enhancing scientific 
collaboration than inter-state STA.
The varying number of STA members of the 
core group concluded may result from different 
general policies and political preferences with 
respect to STA. Representatives from the UK, 
for instance, acknowledged that their govern-
ment were rather reluctant to conclude legally 
binding agreements without an explicit need to 
go for them. German interview partners from 
governmental bodies, on the other hand, stress-
ing positive effects of STA, regarded them to be 
standard instruments of SD. Policy makers also 
differentiated between pull and push factors in 
STA-negotiations. If a member state of the core 
group had a high self-interest in the partnering 
country, it were inclined to initiate negotiations. 
Had a foreign country asked or even demanded 
STA-negotiations, forcing the core group mem-
ber states to decide whether such requests 
were received positively, politely rejected, or in 
some cases even silently ignored, that decision 
would be mainly based on an assessment of 
the partner’s excellence in research, the match 
of science capabilities in specific areas, or the 
general political situation.
Discussion
Our data provides ample evidence for a better 
understanding of the role STA might have in the 
SD-toolbox. 
Fikkers and Horvat’s (2014) view that EU mem-
ber states lacked a strategic plan for the in-
tegration of STA into their international S&T 
portfolio does not stand up to the empirical 
evidence. When looking at how STA developed 
over time, we notice plenty examples of their 
strategic use. The cases of South Africa, policy 
of détente in Europe in the 1980s, the Swiss ap-
proach towards Latin America, and the MENA-
engagement of the U.S. present widely differing 
validations for that. Each of these cases in-
volved strategic consideration of the geopoliti-
cal setting and the role of STA related activities 
in it even though the individual agreement could 
have been concluded on the basis of erratic and 
ad-hoc assumptions. While it is definitely true 
that none of the countries examined showed a 
well-defined strategy for the use of STA, at some 
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point in time such agreements have come to be 
seen as helpful instruments that could stimu-
late and support further engagements and col-
laborations. At the political level at least, we 
concur with the assumption that STA were pri-
marily serving Science for Diplomacy in accord-
ance with the rationales Dolan (2012) and Fik-
kers and Horvat (2014) had pointed out. 
Our data supports the assumption that it is pri-
marily political considerations that lead to con-
cluding STA: building trust, institutionalising 
contacts and providing entry points for subse-
quent communication and projects. Not least, 
concluding a STA provides a good opportunity 
to stage a signing ceremony that celebrates dip-
lomatic relations between the signatories and 
yields plenty of nice photos or videos.2   Seen from 
this angle, it is of only secondary importance 
whether or not STA might enhance scientific 
collaboration. Relating to another case of STA-
negotiations, the Antarctic Treaty System, Elz-
inga (2009) distinguished practical-instrumental 
research from symbolic-instrumental research. 
While the former is concerned with substantial 
problem solving, the latter is of importance pri-
marily to the political system in that scientific 
activities have become symbolic instruments 
to express a state’s geopolitical interest in the 
Antarctic. The conclusion of STA represents a 
symbolic-instrumental action: The involved par-
ties express their willingness to come together 
as equals, using scientific universalism as a ve-
hicle for political objectives. Following this line 
of reasoning, the content of a treaty would be of 
only minor importance compared to the act of 
signing it. Hence STA serve as a kind of bound-
ary object, allowing the different parties involved 
in the process of negotiating and signing it to 
attribute, and associate their own understand-
ings, beliefs and interests to the abstract object 
of a treaty (cf. Star, 2010).
If a substantial STA would be more effective in 
inducing scientists to enter international collab-
orations than a primarily politically motivated 
one is up to speculation only. In this respect, 
governments are stuck between a rock and a 
hard place. If they spell out concrete objectives, 
roadmaps, and maybe even funding schemes 
to stir or intensify scientific cooperation, the 
treaty may become too narrow and no longer 
serve as an umbrella agreement that allows for 
different stakeholders to participate with their 
own agenda of SD or understanding of inter-
national collaboration. Umbrella agreements 
are far more easily becoming boundary objects 
than more specific, content driven ones.  Yet on 
the other hand, the latter might attract more at-
tention from scientists and research organisa-
tions that look for funding opportunities and 
help facilitate and intensify collaborations with 
a partner country. At least this is what some of 
our interviews insinuated when they called for 
more resources to strengthen STA as a tool of 
SD. Vice versa, an umbrella agreement with ‘soft 
wording’ gives the signing parties way more lev-
erage to react flexibly toward newly arising chal-
lenges and S&T trends. Yet this flexibility comes 
at a price; scientists and research organisations 
more interested in substantial programs and 
funding to support their global outreach will be 
less easily enticed to get aboard.
Regarding the second dimension of STA, the sup-
port of scientific projects and international col-
laboration, our interview partners unanimously 
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commended bilateral agreements between re-
search organisations or funding institutions as 
most effective formats. Unfortunately, we could 
not include these to our study. Nevertheless, it 
is highly reasonable to assume that such agree-
ments and memoranda of understanding pro-
vide much better frameworks and opportunities 
for scientific interaction between individual re-
searchers and research groups from two differ-
ent countries.3 
While we have shown that the countries’ motives 
to conclude STA are not always erratic, we par-
ticularly want to highlight the strategic interests 
that the countries of the core group have shown 
in the BRICS-states. Clearly, close scientific 
connections and common research agendas 
are prevalent among many highly industrialised 
countries, mostly, of course, among the mem-
bers of the G8-group. Yet rising economies like 
the BRICS become more and more integrated 
into this network of bilateral treaties, collabora-
tion and exchange. STA represent a first step or 
entry point to tap into new markets, raise atten-
tion for collaboration, and foster economic and 
scientific ties. Moreover, from our interviews it 
becomes very clear that there is a considerable 
demand for legally binding agreements from the 
side of at least some of the BRICS-states. One 
has to keep in mind that in the field of diploma-
cy, agreements have a symbolic value that many 
countries hold in high esteem regardless of any 
substantive effects; once again this echoes our 
finding that STA tend to be more important for 
the political side of international science policy 
than for the scientific agenda. Concluding STA 
provides emerging economies with an opportu-
nity to enhance their position in the diplomatic 
sphere, put themselves on the global map of 
S&T, and subsequently accumulate prestige or 
reputation. Mutual interests–even though they 
may follow very different rationales–of industri-
alised and newly industrialised or rising econo-
mies thus seem to be the main drivers of the 
development of a network of STA that we can 
see emerging all around the G20-states.
Yet our findings have also shown many differenc-
es between the investigated countries. Referring 
to Table 2, we need to tell apart organisational 
types (research vs. ministerial) and different na-
tional approaches. Obviously, the number of trea-
ties covered in our sample does not correlate 
with either the size or scientific performance of 
the countries we looked at. Once again, this sup-
ports our proposition that the uses of STA do not 
follow any automatism but rather reflect national 
idiosyncrasies and strategic preferences valid 
for at least a period of time or a specific area 
of the world. Denmark and the UK, for example, 
prefer other instruments of SD; they concluded 
only one STA-like agreement (DK) or opted out of 
signing new STA a long time ago (UK). Germa-
ny and the U.S. on the other hand have taken a 
continuous and vivid interest in this instrument. 
The literature on U.S. engagement in SD counts 
STA among its important tools (Dolan, 2012). 
STA activities between the U.S. and countries in 
the MENA-region might be a case in point for a 
broader, embedded strategic approach to SD, ac-
companied by highly symbolic political actions 
like President Obama’s Cairo speech in 2009 
(Holt, 2015). Yet our interview data also supports 
the view that it is primarily different national 
strategies that guide the negotiations of STA. In 
a large number of cases, they seem to simply in-
Working paper
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
13
dicate that they are regarded a customary part 
of international science policy and SD. A long 
history and continuous sequence of STA backs 
this interpretation. Yet this does not mean that 
the absence of these factors may indicate a gov-
ernment’s lack of interest in SD since the coun-
try may prefer other instruments than formal 
agreements for its SD. The UK, for instance, is 
strongly engaged in promoting international col-
laboration through the Newton Fund (cf. Grimes 
& McNulty, 2016). In contrast to a legally bind-
ing umbrella agreement, its design is based on 
bilateral co-founding mechanisms that combine 
the symbolic-instrumental level with resources 
for practical-instrumental research. In Denmark, 
bilateral cooperation is organised more on the 
ministerial level; memoranda of understanding 
with Brazil, India, and South Korea, once again 
illustrate the core group’s interest in the BRICS. 
In a similar vein, the EC acts in more than one 
way to buttress bi- and multilateral international 
relations in S&T. The pattern of its STA coincides 
mostly with that of the EU member states. Yet 
we have to keep in mind that the EC also negoti-
ates other agreements, in particular those regu-
lating access to the Framework Programs, there-
by preserving additional leverage, and power to 
pursue the EC’s objectives in international S&T 
policy. That these kinds of agreements were not 
covered by our study does not mean there is no 
bilateral scientific interest or interaction. Rather, 
Denmark, the UK, and the EC tend to handle it in 
other ways than the U.S. or Germany prefer. 
It is beyond the scope of our study to tell if um-
brella agreements are more effective–bearing in 
mind all the difficulties of measurement–than 
treaties between individual ministries or re-
search organisations. Neither could we assess 
possibly different effects depending on which 
ministry is in the lead in negotiating and con-
cluding science-related agreements. However, it 
is highly plausible that national idiosyncrasies 
make a lot of differences even though we could 
not examine their impact thoroughly. 
The bottom line is that we see STA provide an 
opportunity to pursue very different approach-
es, experiments, and rationales for international 
S&T development. Some features of STA-activi-
ties serve general political, only partly S&T-relat-
ed, foreign policy goals. When it comes to the 
uses of, and interests in, STA, there is a great 
diversity of national idiosyncrasies regarding 
both expectations and approaches. STA are just 
one instrument for SD among a range of others. 
Depending on political preferences and local 
conditions, they may be more or less important. 
But in any case, STA are far from being a corner-
stone of SD practice. 
Outlooks for research and practice
Our case study provided new insights into the 
handling, role, and uses of STA-activities in 
different states that pose a number of further 
questions.
Unfortunately, so far we know but very little 
about the effectiveness of STA indeed. Whether 
or not they facilitate the exchange of students, 
scholars, or ideas, stir cooperation or enhance 
academic performance is difficult to capture. Al-
though many countries use indicators to moni-
tor their international S&T activities, it would 
be very far-fetched and misleading to explain 
any development in that field as resulting from 
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the conclusion of STA. The reality is way more 
complex; confounding factors impinge on the 
measurement of STA-effectiveness. While our 
interviewees suggested some positive effects 
following the conclusion of STA with respect to 
trust building and communication, for research-
ers and practitioners the effectiveness of STA 
remains an open question or even doubtful. In 
the light of recent discussions in bibliometrics 
about the limits and unintended consequences 
of measuring research outcomes or research ex-
cellence, we cannot but strongly advice against 
any effort to come up with new metrics of STA.4  
Instead, qualitative assessment processes 
and quality assurance could and should be 
strengthened. Integrating different stakehold-
ers from the field of SD into a dialogue about 
the strengths and weaknesses, potentials, and 
limits of STA would also be far more promising 
to monitor their effect and efficiency.
In terms of future research, we recommend to 
shift the focus of attention from individual in-
struments of SD, like STA, to toolsets and the in-
terplay of different parts, or components, of SD. 
STA, like all other policy-instruments, need be 
viewed, interpreted, and assessed in a broader 
context of activities and science-related poli-
cies. Erratic patterns that seem to indicate a 
lack of strategic planning, may turn out to be 
highly important, and valuable, instruments of 
SD to address a specific policy target.5 
In this general regard, we spot two main types of 
questions. First, it would be worthwhile to further 
explore the relation between intergovernmental 
STA and the abundance of other oftentimes semi-
official or even informal agreements between re-
search facilities or funding organisations. In our 
study, we have seen that both groups of actors 
lack information about what is going on at the 
other side of the aisle. Science diplomats would 
be well advised to look beyond formal regula-
tions and legal caveats when seeking to strike 
agreements with partner countries; they also 
need to reflect and serve the interests of their 
own research community in the management of 
international S&T activities. Umbrella STA could 
play a more important role if they are combined 
and tuned with more specific agreements and 
programs in individual areas of research and in-
novation. At the same time, exchange and col-
laboration programs might raise attention for the 
potential uses of STA.
A second entry point for further investigation re-
sults from our findings that the history of STA–at 
least to a certain degree–reflects constellations 
and shifts in world politics. The reintegration of 
South Africa into a system of international re-
lations after the end of apartheid represents a 
good case in point. We could only study such 
correlations and connections on a very general 
level without examining the underlying process-
es in detail. For a better understanding of the 
workings and potential benefits of STA, research-
ers should look into the specific conditions un-
der which they were concluded, particularly into 
interdependencies with variables like (regular or 
irregular) government changes, disruptive ge-
opolitical events like the end of the Cold War or 
the start of the ‘War against Terror’ in the 21st 
century, or changing power balances or strate-
gies in the global sphere.
Last, but not least, it would be useful to further 
elaborate on the divides between ministerial 
and scientific as well as different national ap-
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proaches that we touched upon in our interview 
analysis (see Table 2). Sociologically speaking, 
variables like organisational and national iden-
tity heavily impact the style of how STA are ne-
gotiated and what they cover in more than one 
way. National and organisational idiosyncrasies 
like differences in the division of labour, tasks 
and procedures, or between epistemic commu-
nities more often than not affect the formation 
of STA. Micro-analyses could illuminate these 
facets of STA way better and more informative 
than our case study. It may also be worthwhile 
to tap into the research on the negotiations of 
international agreements, for instance from the 
economic area (e.g. Crump, 2017). At least we 
need to know much more about how different 
variables play into, and influence, the uses of 
STA in international science policy in general 
and SD in particular. By engaging in this line of 
research, scholars would render a valuable ser-
vice to practitioners and help them enhance the 
use of STA as an instrument of SD. 
Footnotes
1  The report states that „EU Member States on the other 
hand, follow a different strategy. They sign STI agreements 
with a myriad of third countries, often because of ad-hoc 
reasons or because of historical ties.” (Fikkers & Horvart, 
2014, p. 41) It remains a mystery to us, how “ad-hoc rea-
sons” and “strategy” could possibly match.
2  See, for example, the signing ceremony between the 
U.S. and Serbia in 2010, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=LUnBQvTUd7g , last access 18.08.2017.
3  This rests, of course, on the assumption that organisa-
tional support for such interactions is needed at all.
4  See for example the debate on the assessment of re-
search output, excellence, and performance: San Fran-
cisco Declaration on Research Assessment, http://www.
ascb.org/dora/; Leiden Manifesto for Research Metrics, 
http://www.leidenmanifesto.org/.
5  Even though, contextual factors might explain a great 
deal of the large typological variance, we agree with the 
literature that quite many STA are concluded on an ad-
hoc basis.
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